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Debasis Mishra, Indian Statistical Institute:Lectures in Mechanism design

([西财新闻] 发布于 :2018-07-10 )

光华讲坛——社会名流与企业家论坛第5064

 

主题:Lectures in Mechanism design

主讲人Debasis Mishra, Indian Statistical Institute 

主持人:西南财经大学经济学院 杨再福 教授

时间:2018712日(周四)上午11:00-12:00

2018713日(周五)上午10:00-12:00

地点:西南财经大学柳林校区格致楼918会议室

主办单位:经济学院 科研处

 

主讲人简介:

Debasis Mishra is a Professor in Economics in Indian Statistical Institute, India. He completed his PhD in Industrial Engineering in University of Wisconsin, Madison. His research focuses on theory of auctions and mechanism design, social choice theory, and game theory. He has published several papers on Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, and other leading journals.

主要内容:

Title 1: Mechanism design: Basic definitions and efficiency

In this talk, we introduce mechanism design and discuss various preliminary results. We will discuss revelation principle and a benchmark impossibility result by Gibbard and Satterthwaite. Then, we will show the power of domain restrictions. In particular, we will see how environments involving monetary transfers and a particular form of preference allows you to get several possibilities in terms of achieving efficiency.

Title 2: Mechanism design: single object allocation

In this talk, we will get into various models of allocating a single object. We will discuss Myerson's optimal auction, Green-Laffont impossibility, Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility results. We will discuss the power of property rights in this environment. In the process, we will layout basic tools for designing mechanisms.

Title 3: Mechanism design: multidimensional private information

In this talk, we will see how the template of designing single object mechanisms can be extended when the private information of agents involve multiple dimensions. We will prove general revenue equivalence results and discuss the role of monotone allocation rules.


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