主 题：Same-Firm Audit Office Switches and Informationally Motivated Opinion Shopping
主讲人：Yu Hou,Assistant Professor,Queen’s University
主 办：会计学院 科研处
候宇（Yu Hou），加拿大多伦多大学博士，清华大学经济管理学院会计学博士。现任加拿大Queen’s University商学院助理教授。现有多篇论文已经在Review of Accounting Studies，Contemporary Accounting Research 以及Accounting Review 上发表或接受。
Client companies switch auditors to avoid going concern audit opinions. Such opinion shopping activities may either be informationally motivated or driven by managerial opportunism. We empirically test these alternative motives for opinion shopping in the setting of same-firm audit office switches, in which client companies change their audit engagement offices within the same audit firm. Adopting the empirical framework in Lennox (2000) to the U.S. data from 2000-2015, we find that client companies successfully improve going concern audit opinions through audit office switch decisions. Moreover, the above-mentioned empirical finding is stronger when opinion shopping involves larger audit offices, industry specialist offices, and offices in the same metropolitan areas. More importantly, we find that successful opinion-shopping companies tend to choose audit offices with low Type I errors, and they exhibit higher earnings quality than nonsuccessful counterparts. Overall, the evidence suggests that same-firm audit office switching is informationally motivated and improves audit quality.